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AGREEMENTS in ESTRAINT of TRADE:
Origin and History:
The rule that contracts or covenants i. restraint of
trade are void originated at an early day in the Englih law
The social condition of the country was woful. "Traie and
the Lecnaiic arts ;were i, their infancy"; the artisaIs li.-
ited in number; mierchants with capital by -io means overabun-
dant. The population was small, and the country sparsely
settled. The nation desired no paupcrism, but eoai"J
that every citizen be free to engrae hi 1self il taat depart-
ment of labor in , hich his personlefforts would aad most
to the agg'rcgate possessioiis of the country. Hence it was
deemed a atter of crcatest public impoctance to prohibit
contracts which in any way bound as man from the exercise
or use of his trade or busliness in any place for any time.
This rule was enunciated as early as the reil,i of Henry V.
and Judte Hull is reported to have 7one off 1i a )assion at
the sigt of a contract by a buyer enga!in7 to abstain hii-
self from his craft for two yearsand to have coadeuied the
contract in lanu~uae more forcible than elecgant. The great
fear of those early times was that such contracts would re-
strict competition i; trade aint tciid to .ncoura7e .1o1iopolies
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It was sail that the Roman law partially reco-nized
the rule; but it is doubtful if it exists iii the jurispru-
deice of other countl-ies tian those of Ei±7laind aid her colonies and
Am eri ca.
An erneinnt authoriLty states that if the cases are ex-
amined i', co.nnecti.. with, aId i view of, conto-.poraneous
rules nf law anid usages. in trade, ..uch reasoii will be
fouild for beli vino: that the law i _ relatio to tniese can-
tracts crevi out of the Enlish law of apprenticeship. By
this law ii its ori -.al severity"l, says ir. Parsons, Hno
persoF could exercise aiy regular trade or handicraft, ex-
cept aftcrc a lon' apre-ticeship; a.d, generally, a formal
admission to the propr guill or company. If he hal a trade
he 1,ust continue in that trade, or have none. To relinqui&h
it therefore, was to throw >mself Dut of eyueut, to
fall a burden upon the co i.-munity, to becom- e a pauper. " As,
however, the severity of the law of apprentLceship relaxed,
less antag'onism was shown to contracts in restraint of trade
(II Parsons oAi Co±±'racts, p.257.)
For two hundred ye, s after the ca..se ' oore' i the
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Year Books, the rule remained unchanged, and without excep-
tion. The first atteupt made to avoid the rule was by
placing the covenant under seal, but this distilction be-
tween sealed inistruments and simple contracts could iiot be
sustained. The: the distinction between contracts in 'cner-
al restraint of trade and those i.a whirl, the restraint was
limited or partial, was set up and found favor vilth the
Courts, a±,d has remained, nominally the rule to the present
day. This qualification of the rule was reported iii the
case of Rogers v.Parrey, (2 Bulstr,136), and agaiR in
Broad vs. Jollyffe, (1 Cro.Jac.596), in the eighteenth year
of James I, A.D.1621. In the later case, a contract not to
use a certain trad-e in a particular place was held an ex-
ception to the rule, and not void. It was said that it was
usual in London for one to let the shop an-d wjares to his scr
vant when he wvs out of his apprenticeship an! 'o coveia1t,
for a valuabe considoration, not to use that trade in such a
shop, or i±. such a street. In 1711 was dcci 0e] 0 Urt
case of Mitchell vs.Reynolds (I Pr.Wms) All the authorities
were carefully collected ail reviewed by Park,J., and the
rule, as declared i.. the opiion, has beenI follow:'ed up to
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nearly the present day. The distictio.. be ,'ieez- conutiracts
under seal aid those not ui -cr seal, vias fially exploded,
a~i the hstiaetio bt'wec li.te.e a.d '-, cral restraints
fully establisned. Since that descisio", the doctrine of
th early c.scs was no longoe vigcorously i .istei upon. The
populaoz, had impe eased ano. there v, s g-cater coi-pektition
i" all useful pursuits; the lavis of trade bcca _ botiqf
understood; the coaoicrcial and social systm- beca- c develop-
ed and altered, so that the necessities for th e striagplrt
rule which before prevailed had, in a 1.casure, ceased. The
rule, consequently, was relaxed ail nodified, so tOat both
in Ei-1lan1 aL.1 the United States a person _ay coLract for
a valuable cons4icration, not to pursue his occupation: or
ca-'Tins wit-in certain ;'caso.b..-le, rcstricted limits, a l it
will -ot be consi >red as contrary to publc policy, a~l
therefore void. It is not tVat such contracts are a --v ore
legal or enforcablc, 'low, thla they lvere at any foriice.... per-
iod, but that the Courts look differently at the question.
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Principles uicrlyn-r the Rule:
The reasons grivi by the Court i. h:)ldii,7 that conitracts
iii resL'o,'uint of trade are void are -a.,y. Every citizcen
shou!h be fr-c to c.,'are h-iself 'In that ieof.. o
labor, !i v ,-'ich .us persoial efforts ,,ill OC licly to aid
most to the ac rcre- te proluctio..of tie counLry",and, that
public conivOiience requl'Ces "that all the v .riovs trades &a,:
employilients of society should be pursurd, each i- its due
proportion-- a result , ch wich the exclusion of any indiv-
idual fror. his accustoa.ed pursuits has a tediecy to iter-
fere." (Seldcn,J., i.i Lawruece v. Kidder, 10 Barb.). The
Courts have said that since tae products of ian's labor be-
long -i.ediately to the state, that he cannot, by contract,
release his ri t to pursu'e th iat tra or callinc by which
ne cac a, ld most to the a'- recrate wealth of state, arA
n all
thereby col.1pel hiiLself to labor i- so,,c othecr occupation
less a1ivanta~eous to the stte, or lead a life of idleness.
The reaso~is for t>a rule were iivei  the r'et case
of Mitchell vs. Rey:ol 's i~i deail. They are i,-.?r n, sub-
stalite i t'ie well ooiisi Icrod case of Al~er v.Thatcher, (19
Pick.,07)by Alfortoni, J., as follo,'s:
(1) 'Such contracts 1i1juro the parties makiL.,- theii, be-
cause theyr diiaiish their ,.ea.si of procurin livQlihoo s a±:i
a coi..petenicy for their fa._lies. Thoy tei..pt imoirovielit peO
sons, for the sake of present a to :eprive them.selves
of the power to reake fictui'r ac lsition. Atid they expose
such persons to 1imp0osition oppression.
(2).'They toad to deprive the publhc of the servlces of
men L-I the employm-enits and capacities i1which they m'ay be
most useful to the romnmunity, as well as to thei.sehcs."
(3) 'They ,iscouracff incdustry L'-i citerprise, and dis-
inish the p)roducts of iniui-cuty a±I skill."
(4) "Thcy nrevci.it como.eittonu ati enhance or _ccs."
(5) UThey ex:oosc the poublic to I1 tIe evils of Imon-
opoly."
Greater vwei'J-it a a emphasis h.as beei . iv>± by the
Courts to the reasons i 'ara:rrphs 2,3, &aid 4, ;ut ;e shall
see later tnat the Courts durill - the list fe-W years, have,
owin','r to the c'reat advvaiic _.clits :- all thliics coercil A
industrial, lookc upon these fac us, which aovcrici toc e:,.r-
ller Courts in teIlr decisio-±s, as 1io lm.er of special
weili,_t or force, sin-ce those 1aIrers .o iaot ,vo;v exist to ainy
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appreciable extent..
The reasons enumerated by the iJj;sacusetts Court lay
be divided into two classes: (1) : Such coitracts are void
because they injuriously affect the citizen and (2)-:because
they are a detrifhent to the state. That the iterests of
the individual enter into the question at all, is denie.d by
somre Courts. Selden,J., iln Lawrence v.Kidder,tO Barb.641,)
ridicules the idea that the effect upon the individual has
anythinc7 to do with it. 'The principlesof public policy
which lie at the foundationi of this ruleu, he says, 'would
seem to be plain .and obvious, and yet we find it urged in
many of the cases, as an objecioni to the cotract, that it
ten-ded to deprive the pc, sori bound of the ieans of obtaining
a livelihood, as though the personal interests of the con-
tractin' parties had somethinlg to do wilth the doctrine......
It is nevertheless clear that the validity of the coyeract
does not depend in . the slightest deo,-ree upon the ques bio±'I
,-dnether it is u cn, cl )c " o,7 .v'i -i,;, u p ary, bound.
Tie ib 01 ui; , pu±IC uiw -,o ',-c <osiiered in the
adoption of this rule.'
Contracts held void, where aiiple territory as left to
tie obligee to carry on his business, or, where the re-
striction covered more territory t.he b
reasonably be expected to extort- is busi,,css over, are iadc
to turn, by Lie Neow '/ork Judffe, eiitirely upon the questiois
affectiia the pblic alone, v,'i. U1hout thouzrht of private iiter-
est, because, i.. the o,L case, the., public ronvience dci-a-is,
that the pursuit of the various arts and trades shouli be
distributed throuthout the dliffereit sections of the coun
try, so that every locality shoull have its appropriate ac-
comodation, anl, in the othLr cAsE, becaus c ;:e public is
cut off frcx.- tle '-cxfit of av.irh Suc art or trade carried
oi i . that torritvry. But, notwihs hJ,Ii, "Itt th c '_ts
have co irol ,_ost the protectio.- of public iterests in
establishi.ic tis doctrine, the better opilon, at la3t, in
the later cases, Is tat ti, doct'u o is fouilei upon two
principal grounis. One is the injury to the public by bei,
oprivc. of the a-ava.-t , of co-pctition i,, skille labor,
the othe:r is the iijury to the t)urty .,oelf by bein T re-
s- rictod f-oiL f'i].o,,.nT Ias ra'io or busi:iess, a'l t hus be-
!li preve.ited fro. supportiun" hiiaiself a I IL.ily. (Oregon
Steaz Navic-ationi Co. vs. Wi.isor, 20 YIi,
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Essential Requisites of tie Rule:
A: Res int -ius- be partial:
It is a well settll r le of lai L'61t a ill
Celoral restrait of d..e is illegal an.d void, but CLi
acrr cc. c-' e opera s oily as-a partal .... i. is
vali d, i f it orosscs the oLtc.r essetial features. The
term "cliera 1 1 is nlot synonymous with universal. Aprc oects
coverin c, only part of thic territory of the ki.ngdom or state
have 'heon hell to 1'e too .,1r'al ail thm'efor', void. The
criterlOn ,4eLt n wp,,,-e. .t is _artial anid vall, or too
7C ncral an vold, is the Unreasonableness of the rostralit.
(IT Poincroy Lquity Jursproderce, sec.934) wht restrictions
of territory have been held partial will L:orC fully be ex-
plaed in a ueut ra h. It 1_ suff'Ci_,t for ,ne
i± _ subsequcl-t ;)_iagaph. is ,'I
presenit heail to state that tn1 -Piecal rule is t':at aza7
ment is valid which .rcly operates iii restralniL' trade over
part of the state or kiridom, and One o;i trt as a Oc-
straillt ovor tho c.jre kin ,oi or country, is void.
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B" Consi cerati on.
In order that an aclreeLincit iii cestraint of trade be
valid, the-re ,,t be a consi leration. The Courts at o~e
ti..e supoosed that thc consiler'a±tlo xi be adequate (itch
ell v. Reynolds), but siince the 1 ccisio of Hitchcock v.
Coker, (6 Ad. & E.438), the notio: that the co sidoration
must be adequato to t)_e restraiit -as io lon-ryr prevailed.
The Courts 4-ill no lonr.er rnquire inn the qunstion whetner
the conslieratioA for the restr:i.nt is, or is not, alequate.
If the contrat shovis ofi its face a co1ral aid valuable can-
siderationi, it is sufficient. The partics thc.,selves, upon
their own view of all the circu.Lstanacs, surroundinr, the
cont'ract, -.ust etermiae wvctier or .ot, the coiisideration
is adequatr or inadequate. (Guerad vs.Daudelt,32 Md.561,
Smath's L.C. Part II, note,p.778) To look i, to the ade-
quacy of Lie coasileration, the law would be practically
iakin- the ba'7ain, instead of determiiiii-, only what is a
reasonable an-1 poper barain (Hitchcock vs. Coker,supi)
IL Pierce vs.Fuller (8 .lss.,223) o~iC dollar was held to 1,e
a sufficient consideratio!n for a covenanit not to run a stage
coach betwee Providence ali, Boson in oppositieon to the
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Plai. ti ff.
A cois1,icratlon is .ecessar althoufh the contOact be
under seal. At co.,,on law, this is probably the olily ex-
eoptio:i to the rule that a co - t unt, seal i1.ooLts a
coniieratioii vwhicn a party is not ,cr -. ted to Iri:y. (Met-
calf o: Contracts sec.233) The reason of this i-co;,sistcmcy
is th'aat lcosilcratl is re required for a diffc rt
reason thah that w -hceon the or-1i rv law of c.trac 1th-
out coisidleratio!- rests. The reaco. bcii i ' hat it would 'be
unrcaso,able for a -an to '.ter i.ito such a stipulation wi- J
out so...e coni icratat1i , though it must be left to a sei-se of
hiis ow,,i iinte.r-ests to *1e-ecmi ic vtshaould be thie zanoulmt or
nature of the co-sileraLion. (Hitchcock v.Coker,suprz)
C: Rest-,At -ust be Reasoiabl2c.
The c.. al rule is that contracbs wh ich i-oose an
unreaooa resttaint upon the exercise of a .usiiess,
trade, or professioi, are void, but colitracts i., reasonable
restraint are valid. No precise boundiary lue c-i- be laid
down with w., ich th.o rrstr t i ,vol+ be Caso,±ble, ao-1
boyonl ,hich, excessive. One of the ciief facctocs in le-
tcrmnini, tle reasonabl-. ess of th restrai--t is th, j)i te±t
of the territory froA which the person is restricted. The
Courts at the oreseoit ti.-e alloj a Luch , wider r StLaint t,-
fomierly Cov.irciJ welfare a:J. bu.i.±e-s exi,',fcics icm&M
it. The rule is becominc- bronier in its effect as will a
ooar upo exa:iin tioii of te later decisio:.s.
Ti> -lot nir, vahiat is a reasonable restrLint the
cont:-act shouli be viewdi in all its aspects. If it such
only as to afford 'fair protnetion to the i:terc o  of the
party i, favor -f who-_ it is -'ivco, a d 1 ot so lir-e as to
interfere with thw i terests of th-. public," it will be
,, e-ardd tino eye of t we i, as reasonable. aorner vs.
raves,q Bing.735). The answer -4av 'eoe.-I upon the v.arious
cmrcu±stances brou-7ht to car upon it. The situation or ob-
ject of the t rties; the trade or profession alid te way in
which it is eo1ducte'; the o rs f inhabitants iA the
district, r .iaterial f(ac -s 11 • ,in whot'mr th0fe-
strai,,t cont.actni! for is re&soii.ble for the or oection of
the iterests of t , -arty in whose Lvor it is 1-9ose'i, <iJ
not specially 1ijurious to the public. (Horer \ Iev ,
supra, -HuIbbari vs. M,,Iiller,27 ;J., ch. 15)
- 1 n
Tii ,c:
T1e question of ti:.c i the rcAtrictinn is ur i- orU&_t
in lhtm, aheili-ililr " contact Is voil1, aS hei f i re-
strali.t of t.ude. If the rcstrait is othervise reasoiiaLble,
the cic:c .... , J t it is indeflnite i,, ti.e will not" -e I.. l I Ih c ric
affect its validity, and, on the o hr h,-r , if th. -c*ract
be reasonable in- othcr r c scsa liti at
will not cur'e the iller'ality. The reason of this is th-t
the public are for the tii-.e be-in losers of tic services of
te -individual an I do Lot derive a~iy bc;cfit return.
Howcver, Tin lal C.J. (2 I. & 3.20), said that the tI.c cie-
LiCie, caitioj 1e altocrether lI-lt out ii, deterhiiiCc tne qUeS-
tion± whether t.e restraint is o lreasonab. r no  iii qoint
of si. ace. That which would be unreasonable, were it to con-
tinue for aly of ti.-.e mav not be so vwc.. it is to
last o;ilv for a few days.
Presuipti on:
The (eneral presumption. as -ivei by text wri Lers,
and decisiois of Lztzy Courts, -specially the early o.,1s, is
aoaiist all contracts i-i restcaiL-t of tr:adc, whether .CnclU1
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or limited. They are coisidJ'ed priLa facie void, or are
presui,d to bc void uiitil it is shovii i&At the circumstanees
unI-r vihich the coniuract ',vas .ade were suci, -s to reiidrr it
reasonable aj.l also that thcre was a vluable consi cratioi.
(Chappel vs. BrockvLay, 21 Wetil.,157) Contra to thVis vicw;
is the )pinion of Christiaicv in Hubbard v. iller (25 ",Tch.,
15) , ',here it is said that Uthe rule to be drawn froL,. a care
ful analysis of the adjudrped cases a.-id the roasoxo U-ioi
hich they are fo. ilcd, does not scci.. to us to in1olve any
such presumption, '1i the accurate or le-al se:±se of t".e tenS"
The rule o!'e corr-otly statcd, he says, would' be that all
contracts i-, r-strai, t of trade are void 'considerad only
in the abstractu. But if they are colsisiercd with the sur-
rouniin i lcur~a~ic os vi i, iid 'ilh refc'ce to vihich
they were ..:de, all the rcstriction appears reasonable,A ad
the -;eici'ht or effect to c :c- to these circuaistances is
not to be affected by any presuzmtion, for or a;ainst Vhe
validity of the rcstriction.u
Sale of Secr,et Arts or Pateats:
Coi-tracts for the exclusive use of a secret art or
pate.it alc not ',,itlhin thC rule and will be uo_,ld if they
are ii othe ' respects valid. The re-.soninoi, -ov,;evcr, i,'hlch
un torlus a 7i 'overis the decision in both lIhues of eases,
is the same. 7he rig hts of i±± lividuals a-l tho iiteres's
of tic public requi:c it. If public policy requires that
contracts be void which deprive the state of the b-oiefit of
the talent a"! labor of a citizen, it, Oi the other haiid,
1Ci_,ais tli _t where a person has obL aid lcqiti..a- c ly so.e-
tharr' whic, he wants to sell, he shoid bc allo eo Lo sell
in the way .o.s aiva .taous to 41m, a. i to do this, it is
oftoi, iiecessary that hc shoull be able to bi.,i hamseli to
abstaia from again teriaT iito the busi±±,ss. T-.s policy
c:.ablcs .)ersons to cater ito restrictive cov'iaiits a&:d if,
in the juhment of the Court, are not urneasonable, looki w
to the subject -atter of the conbract, th-1 aill be upheld.
,eathcr Cloth Co.vs.Lorso.t,L.R.9 Eq.,345)
The -xccptin7 of aptentcd rinventions aid secrets of art
or trade, not pat ntcd, from the fc-cral rule is allovied,
"for the purpose of stimulatin inventive 7,-ius a id of m -
coura nrr science atid viel l-di rcctocl inoruity." (Mackinnon
Pen Co. v. Fountain Ink Co., 48 N.Y. Superior Ct.,442)
Juic Peckham, ii tc-e case of Good v. Tucker G. Carter Cord-
ave Co. cti icrcil this quostiol carocfully, a"1id thls ex-
ceplion to the rule :."-y pcrrhaps b loft clear, Lild the reason
for it C....--sed .:ore accurately, if th-a of the
Court is c1vCic. A patc.oe 1li this case a>recd to allow the
defc ,-1 _ . ts thr exclusive use alid sale oa the wesTern coi-
tincait, of certaln inventionis pateixted by1 h1i1, alili to w,-rrar2 it
aii protect thc,,. i._ the 1i-anufacture ',1,d sale of he . "The
owi±'-r of a patent, says Peckhai, J., "may keep the rifmt of
iit.ooducii, the 1nvei.ntion to the public, or ke the chi-
cry or x:fac, .e the patcniod artlcle alone, or he iay
pcr~at othe-rs to share such r17_lt with him, or h ,,.ay allow
the ai exclusive r -'ht 1 -r ,Llo.c himself It .ll
follows and is founde: d uoori the absolute 3,l exclusive rilht
which the owiner of a pate±it has iti the aotcic oatcnted,
havin- suchn rip'ht he- ._ust plainly be permitte!d to sell to
another the ri'ht itself, or, to Larer. with him *,hat h. will
per m-it none oth -r / ~a such person to use it. Cois-Ldr'r-
-I6-
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atojis, which mjht obtaili if tic acprencrit were in rccard
to other articles, cannot be of a-,! wei-6it ii tic 
decsiol




Restraint as to Space:
The .atter of space 1,- t1ic contracts of parties who
bin i tho. -selves not to exercise thcir ordinary rifiits has
bee,-, and still s,a iost iiqportant qursti on in dletermninc
their invalldity or validity.. Ii forr ti'iels, if the
rostrai-t was ec:Ioral, nothi.-r -ore need be ascertained, the
covenant bclir void. It was an essetial requistite tat
the contract should be partial as distinuished froD general
The torm cenral, howryror v Is ot usoK ii. the so.,se of
universal. To-day, the coi-;,iact will ot fall to the
rround, siraply bocause it -s unliittcl as to territory.
Still the subject of sIaco is thc iiic-post lookce to by
the Courts in d termiimr whether the stipulation is reason-
able or unreasonable. That it ..,ay be semi exactly how the
Courts nave vievied the quesuioii ll. itation ,ill be
cowsidread pa'tial ad what -'cnral, it will be best,perhaps,
to -rive a brief state- ocnt of facts fro.;. a few 1adne1 cases,
a d in. nearly their chronological order, anit ith numerous
quotatioiis from the Opiions. Li so doi. :, the re , ill be a
reiteratio;a of i.:dch alcally --iven, but it is hopel this ;ill
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be coipcinsatod by arriving at a clearer aai'1 L ore exact un-
derstanding of the whole subject, both in its past and its
present.
As has already been stated, the rule first emunciated
was that any acree..ent whereby a person bond himself not to
exercise his trade or business was void, notwithstanding it
was lliited as to a place certain and for a tmi:-c certain;
that also tis rule did rot loac- stand but was superseded by
a more reasonable holding, and, that the doctrine was set-
tled by the great case of Mitchell vs. Reynolds--if indeed,
it was not settled before-- that an acrreemerit iii restraiht
of trade, reasonable 11n its terms, supported by a valuable
coisideration, and liiated as to space, is good and Liot
coi trary to public policy. This -rule on i-1s ;.re r i c'e-
-al the sai .e for -early two hundred years, but the in-
terpretation of it to-day is widely different than even a
quarter century ago. 114aat was once looked upon as a genieral
restraiit may noa be considered as partial a-iIl in fact, ,Iny
be nao restraint at all.. As aii illustration, in the early
part of the 18th ceitury, a mili±an sold his busiaess t.nd
covenanted not to engage in it a~ain upoi crrtaii- streets,
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(his old route), Thls was a 'artial oestraL.t. To- y the
:r<2choai~t ,y sell Als busincss, a d bivl i.,_self f
exrrcisuIs it WiI ili t'ic x-lirc ' l icdo~i.
A bri ef exaiiinatio. of a f-Ii eases ,iill. soi ;ie . o -
fcatios that ',nCvo taken place iii applyla±- the rule.
One of the earlicst kieoricaii cases was that of Pierce v
Fuller,supra, Wiich was adjudicated i i .assachusc~ts i IiI
L- this case, the obligation was aot to run a s oa betvir)n
Bosto. 1 Proviclcice, a distauco' of about forty Lflles, i
oppositon to the platiff's sAar'e. The restric-lo.,, was
uphold, and the decision followed b , several cases i. that
state.
Ti the case of Alker v. Thacher,supra, the condition
Was that the obliqor should ncv-r carry o, or be cone rnel
in the busiiness of ioudiff i ron. T-e bond was void, the
restrait be",c, Feiieral.
In the case of Taylor v. Blancchard, (13 Allon,370) the
defandant agreed iicver to set up, exerciseor carry oi the
trade or bushiiess of I aiufacturiiv a,d sellli-i shoe cutter's
at any place within the state. This was also void, as a too
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~encira1 restraint.
Ti 1851, 111 New 7ork, was lccido-1 t'ne case of Lawrciicc
v. Kidler, supra, The defeiiant here covcnatcd not to
carry oi the business of iianufacturing or trainrf inI palm
loaf beds or iattresses, directly or iiirectly, in all the
territory of the state of New York, vcst of Albany. This
limitation was consile-ed a ,eneral o.e.
The case of idlurray v. Vanderbilt, (39 Barb.,140) le-
cided that a coveaint by a:l accan steamsip Co., with znothn
not to runi its boats between the continents of North aiil
South L rca, was void, since it prevoilted cojpettion in
co imaerce, a l oold 1 c -LIe the rates for ta-iisportation.
In the case of Beal v. Chase, (31 lvich.490), Chase
covenia.t-l -ot to onra"e, directly or !idrectly, Uia the
busliss of prlntin- or publishi i- in t"e state of i1lichian.
ThIs was hell to be oi1y a partial al teforc valid rr-
strai at.
Ini the case of Oregon,etc. Navigation Co. v. Windsor,
(20 Wall.), a covr-'nit bv the purchaser of a s-cashlip not
to employ the ship for t 7ui years in the waters of thAe state
of ClJiforaia, was uphcld.
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it is to be ,1 oticed that the early cases consilo a
lilitatlon vihch )Xtort ,s throuo'hout the state, o te
_I S tj Jot , _tt , OC t1
ircat-c portion thereof, as a tot al restrai-t, while il the
lat ,r cases, a ,-i ffre-t vi -w is Y',, cl j u dgrc, t in tne
early cases, it is ,a ,id w-'e founded upo- t.e rc-so)s t'h.at
each state is a i entire jurisdiction ai-i ci protect 1LS
citiz ens only withili its bord, -s, ai1t does -lo, ':-.,o what
benefits they .ay enjoy in other states; aiid. It Is a duty to
see t1_at the.. froedol- of its citizens a not restrained from
all its t-rritory; that it is -t for the iitcrsts of ai
ind ,.c_,,t state that its citizens bc allovied to sell their
1ildustri al freedoi for a small ;resent gaan, aini thereby
be copellcl to re,.LL1 i idle with daner of becoman" a bur-
d,: to the state, or else to seek other - a.. or clins.
IllstnLd of consideri:nv-- eanh state as only one of la:.Ly il the
U.niion, ir which the person would be left free to act, where
he was restrainteI b k ecI tract from one state, Selden,J.,
declared it to be urepugnant to the-Teneral fame and policy
of our government, to rcn'ard the Union 1- respect to our
ordilihva inte-al a1nI_,, domestic interest, as oC consolldated
nation. For these purposes, each state is a soparate corn-
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munity, with separate and indcpendent public interests."
Lawrence v. Kidder, supra. This view it ma, safely be said
is no longer entertained. In Oregon,etc.Co. v. 1aisor,supra
Judge Bradley said that "this country is substantially one
country, especially in all mat-t-Crs of trade and bus-iess'"
Again, and later, the positionl of Selden, J., is de-
nounced by Christiancy,J., i Beal v. Chase,supra. It is
asked by the Judge if the nccessary and probable consequence
of a contract which binds a person not to c-carre i n a par-
ticular business within the state, is to bring that person
to idleness or ii: :.iration. In answer to this, he says,
that in former times, it m'nht have been so 'but in this
country, at this time, where m- erchants become 1aiufacturers
and larers farmers, and farmers tradeers', simply because
they believe that such changes will be for their advantage,
and not because they receive a consiierat:on. ""Any rule
of law, therefore, 'which should assumie that one who for a
coisideration bargained not to follow his previous businiess,
had thereby bound himself to idleness and penury, to the
detriment of the state, would be a rule absurd in- itself a,:
contrary to creneral experience and observation.' Nor does
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the lccrmui JuI1e coisid r it a.i, objOct i oi' .-o suah a con-
tract that it .v possibly result ii: o-e pa'ty oiu. beyoiJ
the state to mr s ce a:-e',, u± the b siess. The intrests of
a state he svs e ot so potty or exclusive ai.d its policy
so . Lir i n i i vidious t1 t its rules a-ce fra,-.ed to keep
people within th: state, em'trary to thcir inclinatio--, or
where it vould be for their i;terests to 7o elsewhere.
Frou,- the last t;.o cases cited, it is seen that it contra
in rcstrailit of trade .lay be reasonable a- ±. valid, eve. if
the ewtLie territory of a state is included ii the restric-
tion. Has the low-water .,-ark of public policy forbearance
booni reached? T>zs is best 4" by ai exam.iatlon of the
followviin cases: Dia_,1o:i- ,Hn,::tch Co.v.Roeber (106 N.7 .,433);
Rousillon v.Rousillon, (14 Ch.Div.351.); Leslie v.Lorillard,
(10 N.{., 519)-; aii Watertown Terixoeter Co. ,v.Poole, (51
Hun, 157)
In the first case tho drfen-lanUt, \'ho was din th
manufacture -L the state and sale throug7hout tL'e states and
territories, soll the ..aiiufactnryV and 'ood will of the
business, to thV- plav -tiff, an., covanatcd not to emiarne iin
the 4.-nufactu1c or sale of fricton matches for n~intv -nie
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ycars, except in Montana and Nevada. The restraint was held
partial, reasonable,and valid. The opinion of the Court is
criven by Andres,J., and the subject is carofully considered
'The tendency of recent adjudicatios', he says, 'is marked
in the direction of relaxin- the ripor of the doctrine that
all contoacts in c7eneral restraint of trade are void, ir-
respective of special circumstanccs........W hlen the re-
straint is general, but, at the saile time, co-extensive onily
with the interests to be protected, anA with the benefit
meant to be conferred, there seems to be no good reason why,
as between the parties, the contract is not as reasonable as
when th restraint is partial, a-.id there is a correspoadthg
partial restraint." He also refutes the doctrine that a
general restraint of trade depends on state lines. 'The
boundaries of the state," he says, ' are not those of trade
and commerce, and busicss is restrained within no suc> lligte
Some trades ani' enploirmnts are from their nature, local,
but 1 anufacturin, industries, in 7'eneral, are not. It is
only reasonable, that when a person has by industry and 3R-
terprise built up a business whir-7  xtmeis ov . ...
that he be allowed to aceopany tb.c sale with a stipulation
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for a restraint co-extensive with the b-,Osiio'ss >e sells. He
iay, thereby, obLain a better price. Such a pVrsoll is in
no more dan!7er of becommnir a burdei upen the state th- O-
k U 1 ki OIle
-dho sells a busiaess, local in 1 ls nature.
In the case of Rousllo_.,v. Rousillon, the defendant,
in obtainiwn emploT cnt as a traveller for a wine .orchant
arees not to carry on the wine busi. ess for tw~o years after
lcavirir- his eLployment. The business extenids throughout
England auid Scotland. The agcreoi-lnt Is valid. Fry, J., in
this case doubted ii there had ever been, a "hard and fast
rule" as to how great a restraLnt would reIder a contact
void, and he refused to adzhere to those case s in which an
unlimiute prohibition was void without regard to the cir-
cuLstances and iaturo of the busilness.
I Losle v. Lorilla-d, the defendant, a corporation,
agreed not to run or be interested in ruiming steail,-ships in
opposition to the plaintiff's line upon their route. The
contract is valid. In deciding whether the contract is
contrary to public policy and void, because 1. restraint of
compeition, and tending to create an imonopoly, Gray,J., said
'the tedency of modern thought and of the decisions, how-
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over, has been lo lonper to uphold i its strictncss, the
doctrine vwhich formerly prevalled in respect of anreemcrets
in restr..int of tradc. u The mle bcaie relaxed. "This
chalc-e was r-radual a1A may be coi-nsiddr , per'iaps as due,
.maI.y to the ,Iovith a!n " sprrad of irlustrial activities,
of the world, and to enlarged coi.-crcisal facilities, vchch
rciider such ar- 'r cci.ets, less dancucrous, s tniii,- to create
monopoli Cs. U
In the case of Watertown Thero.ometer Co. v. Poole, the
defela1t, for a cDnsidcrati,.i, asszgied, the Trade-Mark
used ii tho manufacture of therm o-m.ters and storm-,-lasses,
a:I also ac-cd, "not to cn c e i the -alnufa-cture of
thermometers or storm- ,lasses, at any place ,ithi the
Uni tc. Statos, at any tjie iithi the perio.L of tcn years.
This restrai±t, thouTh cencr 1, did not uvalidLate the co-i-
tract, for th'e learned Ju1-'e, who wrote te opiion, con-
sidered it mly, lco-extensi:e only, with the itcr'sts to
be protected, ani with the benfit e nt to bo cojc'rred by
the agreement.
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,Th. then is the true rule at preseit?. le "av s !i
that a porsoil .'a; rest'a li imiself fro," -xcrcisini a busi-
iless anr±liere withiir the Uni'itd States, if it is reno-Lsoble,
aiid co-extcllsive wi'uh tae ' S!ijcss sold, aiicI tIe til:,.-rcsts
to be protected. The old rule can lo lon~er be 3ive as
sound. The reaso,;s which supported it are .,,uc! less forci-
ble iow than wh-en Mitchell v. Reynolds was decided. ISteamn
ad electricity have, for the purpose of trade and co-,:,;rrcc
a1most annihilatec listance, ai. the whole world is now a
mart for the listribution of the products of industry. The
.rreat diffusion of wealth and the restless activity of man-
kind, strivin 7• to better their col1itioin, has crcatly en-
larged the field of human enterprise, and crecatod a vast
nui.,Thr of new ifndustries, '-hich give scope to ingenuity and
employmelit for capi L.l a;J. labor." (Di&amond 1,atcla Co. v.
Roeber, supra).
It is no lon",er feared that the public iill suffer from
want of co .-pcition, but rather f;o-n over-copetition. It is
rue th~at whien the cont.act prevclits th vender fro, carry-
in- oil the particular trade, it deprives the coimunit7, of
any benefit it derive from .,,s outeria> into coipeti-
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tion. But the busiloss is open to all others, a-id if it is
profitablc, capital will be at ha ,1 to .. te it.
NCithcr do th e coi r.-cts crecate ..oopolios "for they
coLfcr no exclusivo privile.es.u
The lawi favor-s thec '-eatest freedom to contract which
is consistent with the 11iterest of the individual ald the
public. It is contrary to th'isr l and absurd to hold a
contract void, mado il the sale of an extr'nsive busi.-ess,
anid with 'e 7ood will of the. saie, al acco; pa-id e wiL>_ a
stipulation ,iot to e:ic-ac in copeitition, vnt-n the vendee,
because the ve, Ior, would be compelled to chazr- his busa -
ness. Such a Umle wouli often pocvci-t a profitable disoosi-
tion of property ala business.
It may tV refore be state1 tiat "t the p-Iccntt
aco:&e'7-ac;, ,vill b- uoheld if rceasonable1- and_ c o- ext enive,
only with the subject -.atter of the co.tract to be protCctod
a .:i tht,too, alao its o' erataon extad to every foot of
grou. in the Unit- States, provided that, t.Iofeby, the
maker is not compellcil to leave the country.

